starting an examination of these central questions, to provide a brief description of the arrangement of the published work and, to indicate how it relates, chronologically and structurally, to the archival material. It will also be useful to remember that the topic of procedure is only a part of Bentham's adjective law writings and that he also has much to say on evidence and adjudication. Whilst these linked topics are obviously of relevance to Scotch Reform, indeed it is impossible from Bentham's perspective to separate the constitutive elements of adjective law, nevertheless, Scotch Reform can be viewed primarily as a work concerned with the system of judicial procedure under the civil law.
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A. 'Scotch Reform': The Published Work and Manuscript
The published body of material for Scotch Reform is not large -a small book presented as a series of four letters, with six statistical tables attached, 11 and addressed to Lord Grenville, the First Lord of the Treasury. 12 Bentham published the work rapidly in response to proposals put forward in Grenville's reform plan of 1806, 13 which sought to transplant many of the procedural practices found in English courts into the Scottish system. 14 Later, on some accounts, Bentham added a short fifth letter College, London, London, 1962. See UC lxxxii. 7-350, xci. 1-322, xcii. 1-478, xciii. 1-535, xciv. 1-555, cvi. 85-229, cix. 27-42 and clxviii. 166-213 (Roman numerals refer to boxes in which the papers are placed, arabic numerals to individual folios). 14 The Scottish legal system had its origins in the sixteenth century with the founding, in 1532, of the College of Justice or Court of Session which was to become the cornerstone of law in Scotland, and to which judges were directly appointed by the king. James VI (reigned, 1567-1625) encouraged the formal reorganisation of the profession and the qualifications and training necessary for a Notary Public were regulated by statute in 1587, the Society of Writers to the Signet appeared in 1594, and the which commented on Lord Eldon's revised proposals following the change of administration in 1806. 15 Initially, an offer was made by Lord Grenville inviting suggestions for the improvement of the Bill from outside Parliament. Your invitation, says Bentham, ... found me employed in putting... the last hand to a work of a somewhat new complexion on the subject of EVIDENCE; ... the object was -to bring to view the reasons, by which I had been satisfied that whether the Roman, the English, or any other system were resorted to, the established rules of evidence, occupied principally in putting exclusions upon the light of evidence, were almost without exception adverse to the ends of justice.
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Grenville's bill therefore appeared at a particularly opportune moment, when issues, the system of pleading, and the use of juries are given a brief treatment in letters three and four.
In contrast the archive material can immediately be seen to cover a considerably wider range of topics, 22 including: the use of bail, the utility of Scottish appeals, procedural costs, the distrust of and powers appropriate to the Edinburgh Court of Session, the desirability of competition, and the need for appropriate instructions.
Bentham continues, however, to devote much time in the manuscripts to a reconsideration of those themes central to the four letters sent to Grenville. 23 The manuscript treatment is generally much fuller and more detailed than in the published work, and certain themes are found discussed in two, and sometimes three, different
versions. Yet, despite the volume of remaining material the text of the one hundred published pages is not amongst the surviving body of manuscripts, and we must, therefore, still begin with the printed work when considering Bentham's proposals for 21 Bentham originally planned for the work to be composed of three distinct parts:
i) 'Proposita': providing a careful examination of the 17 proposals set before Parliament by Lord Grenville in the Scottish Judicature Reform bill, which was passed for a second reading in the House of Lords on 17 February 1807. This part is closely related to the first four 'Letters' published in 1808.
ii) 'Omissa': presenting items omitted in the proposals tabled for reform. Material headed 'Omissa' is linked in some references with the body of text titled 'Letter V'. This second part was never published although a great deal of text was produced; it appears that at least two, and possibly up to four, versions had been drafted by June 1807.
iii) 'Facienda': the reforms which Bentham thought should be introduced. Again, this part was never published.
See Scotch Reform in Bowring, v., p. 30. 22 Forty-nine distinct topics have been identified in the UC archive, most of which were written between 1807-8, and which constitute a substantial extension of Bentham's discussion. For UC box numbers see n. 22 above. 23 Much of the UC archive material was produced after the printing of Scotch Reform in 1807.
procedural reform of the civil courts and the comparison between English and Scottish practice.
B. The Removal of Rules of Procedure
To turn then to the issue of Bentham's anti-nomian thesis, the question we must consider regards how he envisaged his ends of procedure being achieved without any rules of procedure.
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i) The direct and collateral ends of the system of procedure
Bentham provides a clear description of the ends of procedure. The first he terms 'direct' and explains this as, giving execution and effect to the predictions delivered, to the engagements taken, by the other branch, the main or substantive branch of the law: viz. by decisions pronounced in conformity to it.
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The second end he calls the 'collateral', and this is described as 'prevention of delay, vexation and expense, in so far as superfluous or preponderant'.
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To examine, first, the direct end of procedure, it is noticeable that in Scotch The second, collateral, aim of Bentham's system is to reduce the burdens incumbent upon both parties to a suit; that is, to reduce the delays, the vexations 31 and expenses involved in pursing civil litigation. 32 Ostensibly, Grenvilles's attempt to reform the Scottish system of civil procedure was aimed at dealing with the difficulties and delays incorporated in appeals sent from the Edinburgh Courts of Session to the House of Lords in London. This general concern to reduce the delays and inconveniences, financial and otherwise, was the prime objective of the proposed
Bill. This was of immediate interest to Bentham and although, on examining
Grenville's Bill, he was able to claim that, despite reservations, 'in point of utility, there is enough in it to afford an ample justification to the provisional acceptance your
Lordship has been pleased to give it', 33 Bentham was acerbically dismissive of the idea that the proposals would make any substantial difference to the existing burden on litigants. Indeed, whilst claiming that a small benefit may be derived, ultimately he found that the Bill omitted so much that ought to be done in the way of reform that 'it will be found to fall extremely short of the professions, and perhaps expectations, of the learned author'. 34 And he went further, stating that the Bill pursued 'the interest of the community... in demonstration only, the opposite interest of the lawyer being carefully protected, and even advanced, in reality and effect'.
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The purpose of Bentham's offerings on the subject of Scotch Reform was therefore to expose the true, dual role of procedure in assuring the correct standard of evidence and adjudication, and of providing a real protection against unnecessary delays, frustrations and expense.
ii) Corruption of the technical system: 'Judge and Co.'
Bentham opens his assault by stating in quite unequivocal terms that the abuses found in the system of procedure in England as well as Scotland were due to the sinister partnership of judges and lawyers, who had and were continuing to manipulate the system for their own financial benefit. 36 Indeed, the assault on the legal profession is For the immediate proposal at hand Bentham sought to break the power of the judges over the procedural system which they themselves had made, and which was set opposed to the required goal: 
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Throughout the work this opposition is given great attention -the idea that judicature, the judicial end of procedure (i.e. fees, self-interest) was entirely distinct from justice.
The question of redirecting interest, the interest of judges especially, is a fundamental utilitarian element in Bentham's system.
iii) Benefits of the Natural System
The great benefits of Bentham's own system are that they are, in his own conception, generally negative. 51 'Logically speaking, the quality of the natural system will be Of course, this is aimed principally at exclusionary rules, and Bentham clearly allowed the requirements of utility to dictate that evidence can justifiably be excluded if the gain from its admittance is outweighed by disadvantages in terms of delay, vexation and expense subsequently brought with it. 61 The allowance of exclusion in such cases does embody an 'instruction' to the judge, but can this instruction be described as a 'procedural rule' for exclusion. Presumably it cannot, since Bentham's suggestion is that the rule be established at the substantive rather than the adjectival level.
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The rationale presented in Scotch Reform for the removal of rules, is therefore connected with Bentham's underlying political philosophy on the secondary level.
The prevention of exclusion seeks the fullest possible admittance of relevant evidence with the aim of arriving at a swift, delay-free, judgement. If utility is identified in terms of wider knowledge, if knowledge is the beneficial element, then utility must be satisfied within a system of free proof where the fullest knowledge of the available information is allowed. On the primary level, however, in terms of the substantive law being correctly implemented, this could be achieved without any reference to utility, indeed, as the next section will show, it is not suggested that any consideration of general aggregate utility ought to be devolved upon the judge in Bentham's scheme.
C. Judicial Discretion and the Promotion of Aggregate Utility
We now turn to the apparent paradox presented by Bentham's call for the removal of judges' ability to control and construct the system of procedure, whilst, at the same time suggesting that judges be provided with substantially increased powers of discretion. The question to be answered is, how, on a utilitarian basis, will a system which provides the type of discretionary judicial freedom advocated in Scotch Reform from above -those concerning the place of the judiciary within the constitution, and those from below -which are directed towards individual users of the system, the litigants themselves.
i) Legislative control of the procedural process
As mentioned above, the assumption throughout Scotch Reform is that the rule of action provided by substantive law has a correct utilitarian foundation. decisions. 67 The judge has discretion to accept any evidence, and from any source, so long as it assists in the ascertainment of factual knowledge appropriate to fulfilling the tenor of substantive law.
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This however, does not suppose that the primary end of the natural system of procedure is, in itself, utilitarian. If the substantive law were non-utilitarian (or utilitarian law incorrectly drafted) then this would be equally well reflected through
Bentham's natural system, despite any flaws it may possess. It is important to remember that the ends of the system of procedure was to prevent both misdecision and failure of justice and success in achieving these ends could only be gauged by reference to the nature of the substantive law; it appears that Bentham's natural system would work as well with a deontological as with a utilitarian body of substantive law.
There can be no question that Bentham was promoting the extension of legislative control over judicial action. In this sense his theory can be seen as a direct assault on those conventional English notions of the separation of constitutional powers, and protection for the citizen body provided by a thoroughly independent judiciary. The role of the judiciary was to implement legislation defined by legislators, there was no other. Implementation is the key word, not interpretation. Conformity with the rule of substantive law is sought throughout; anything else amounts to judicial misdecision or failure of justice, and again the primary objective of the procedural system will not have been fulfilled.
With this perspective in mind -with the desire to enforce conformity on the part of the judge with the overriding substantive law -we see the limits placed on judicial action. In this sense it cannot be appropriate for a judge to make any direct appeal to utility when confronted with a range of circumstances not envisaged by substantive law, and to which the correct application of substantive law would produce net disutility. The judge can only use discretion in judging the best action in terms of the successful application of the substantive law, and not in terms of the best utilitarian outcome. Thus, in the establishment of proof, evidence should be accepted from any source if, and only if, it has a relevant bearing on the application of the substantive law in question. If the judge discovers flaws in the construction or tenor of the substantive law, then suggestions can be made that the law be amended, or rescinded.
But there is no implication, in Bentham's discussion of procedure in Scotch Reform, that any direct appeal to utility is justified on the part of the judge. Bentham is quite clear; the judge cannot make law under the guise of employing procedure.
The rule embodied in substantive law is therefore the judges' only guide to correct procedure. The important point to note is that under the natural system the responsibility now placed on the judge to ensure court procedure accords with the aims of substantive law is much clearer than under technical procedure. The focus of responsibility is directed towards the individual judge, not deflected by the overall system.
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To make this responsibility more pointedly effective another obvious solution presented itself to Bentham; this was 'single-seated judicature '. 70 This is conceived as a procedural system allowing a single judge to take evidence, hear witnesses, and arrive at decisions on all the relevant evidence available. A judge, that is, who refers to the guiding principles embodied in the substantive law appropriate to the case in hand, and who publishes his decisions at the conclusion of the case without reference to any other court. With the removal of formal, technical rules, which encouraged the transfer of cases from court to court, and frequently entailed evidence being heard by one judge but decision being given by another, an important screen behind which judges took refuge would be abolished. 71 Decisions taken had to be the responsibility of individual judges, 72 and no formulaic barriers ought to be interposed to break the junction of duty and interest. Procedural formulas had allowed the illicit transfer of responsibility from Judge to the system of instituted procedure in general. A tradition had been established whereby authority had become invested in the system -this authority was undermined by Bentham in his overt appeal to the lego-political authority of parliament.
An effective system of procedure requires political control in Bentham's view.
Power is removed from the conventional, archaic system of procedure, and detached from both the political and economic influence of 'Judge and Co'. Judicial authority is 69 On the importance of individual responsibility and its weakening in proportion to the multitude of judges, see UC xcii 306 in particular. Lords was, and ought to remain, the highest court of appeal within the three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland, but also as a threat to the continued well-being of the Union of these three kingdoms itself. The correct, the natural, system of procedure not only represented the superiority of justice over judicature, 75 but of political stability over political division. To protect the Union, and to provide security -the main political aim -the substantive law of the Union had to control the process of civil litigation.
ii) Opening of the system to public observation, recognition, certainty and understanding One of Bentham's fundamental objections to the existing system was that it produced great uncertainty. There was no effective way of assessing, from the position of a prospective litigant, whether the substantive law would be appropriately applied in their case were they to proceed with legal action. compounded many times over for Bentham, specifically because members of the general public had no opportunity of gaining an understanding of the complex rules.
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Such uncertainty was of concern since it embodied a major collateral evil faced by those contemplating using the law and is frequently mentioned in the manuscripts, often as an evil placed ahead of delay, vexation and expense. 78 Indeed, this is a good example of the instances in which the manuscripts are particularly valuable in not only providing an elucidation of the published work, but in presenting sustained considerations of important issues omitted from the material published.
The answer to general public uncertainty was publicity. Not only publicity in terms of publishing the judicial reasons for decisions, 79 but also in the wider sense of opening up the operation of the entire system to general inspection and common covering all relevant details from the number of cases embarked upon, to time taken in hearings and judgements, and the degree of movement of cases between courts in cases of appeal. Statistical comparisons between system and system, court and court and ultimately, between judge and judge, would provide the basis for a thoroughly empirical analysis and critique of the procedures developed.
Being provided with such information individual litigants could measure the progress of their own suits, or predict the course of prospective suits, and in a very practical way observe the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the system of procedure in relation to their own circumstances. The aim of such knowledge clearly creates a very personal power which works directly from the fundamental principle of utility; that on the basis of self-interest tied to duty, individuals would be empowered to recognise stages in the procedural process and be qualified to assess the degree to which it achieves its prescribed goals. 92 In a collective sense this becomes closely connected with the idea of public opinion playing a role in assuring the system's effectiveness. 
